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Abstract
This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity.
Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes
that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends
this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that
have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case,
where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduc-
tion of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security
expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective orga-
nizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods,
and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should
be a central feature of such organizations.
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This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity. 
Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or 
safes that have the characteristics of private goods.  The analysis in this paper 
extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as 
information, that have the characteristics of public goods.  In contrast to the 
private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can 
lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the 
underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride.  Thus, the 
formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the 
production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced 
by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is well documented that private citizens spend large amounts on private security 
measures.  These security expenditures include everything from simple devices 
such as door locks and bars on windows to elaborate electronic security systems 
and private security guards.  Unlike general law enforcement expenditures, these 
protection expenditures are often aimed at the direct prevention of loss, and do not 
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necessarily rely upon ex-post sanctions to reduce the net gain from criminal 
activity.1
The use of private security measures is likely to be important in the 
cybersecurity context.  Use of private resources, including resources aimed at 
gathering information about the nature and frequency of past and future cyber 
attacks may be efficient given the decentralized nature of the internet.  Further, 
traditional deterrence through ex-post sanctions may be difficult to implement in 
this setting for several reasons.  Private resources aimed at identifying and 
pursuing those responsible for cyber attacks often will inure to the benefit of 
others, and thus are likely to be under produced.2  As a result, those responsible 
for cyber attacks may perceive that they face low probabilities of punishment.3  
                                                 
1 For analyses of private law enforcement systems, see Gary Becker and George Stigler, Law 
Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J Legal Stud 1 (1974); William M. 
Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J Legal Stud 1 (1975); David 
Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case, 8 J Leg Stud 399 (1979); 
David Friedman, Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law, 13 J Legal Stud 379 
(1984).  See also Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers 
Accountable, _ Sup Ct Econ Rev _ (2005) (discussing use of vicarious liability as a way to 
increase security and law enforcement). 
2 The Microsoft Corporation recent announced the initial $5 million funding of the Anti-Virus 
Reward Program that would pay bounties for information that leads to the arrest and conviction of 
those responsible for launching malicious viruses and worms on the Internet. See Microsoft Press 
Release, November 5, 2003.  For a discussion of bounties generally, see Becker and Stigler, 3 J 
Legal Stud 1 (cited in note 1). Microsoft, owing to its large market share, can internalize more of 
the benefits of private enforcement expenditures.  However, its large market share and its de facto 
standard status also serves to lower the costs of conducting a widespread cyber attack, and has also 
resulted a many attacks directed at computers using Microsoft products.  For an analysis of the 
tradeoffs involved with de facto standards in the cybersecurity context, see Randy Picker, Raising 
Transactions Costs and Network Security: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky, in The Law & 
Economics of Cybersecurity, M. Grady and F. Parisi, eds. (Cambridge forthcoming 2005).  
3 Indeed, this result in not exogenous.  Rather, it is a result of the fact the benefits from efforts by 
private citizens to apprehend and identify such individuals produce external benefits that, absent 
adequate civil judgments of bounties, inure to the benefit of others. 
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This in turn requires that large magnitude punishment be used for optimal 
deterrence, a difficult task given the difficulty of obtaining meaningful civil 
judgments against many of the defendants.  The large volume and inchoate nature 
of many of the attacks may also make the authorities reluctant to impose large 
criminal penalties on individuals for such behavior.4
Prior economic analyses on security expenditures have examined potential 
divergences in the private and social incentives to provide private security 
measures.5  These studies have shown that the private and social incentives to 
provide investments in security diverge due to an inability to internalize positive 
and negative externalities generated by private security investments.6   
Specifically, positive spillovers include the effect of expenditures that reduce the 
ex-ante net benefit of crime, and thus serve as a general deterrent to such activity.  
These expenditures can include expenditures aimed at identifying those 
responsible for criminal acts, and resources that minimize the harm that occurs as 
a result of crimes.  Negative spillovers include the effect of expenditures that 
serve to divert criminal activity from those who invest in private security to those 
                                                 
4 The paper does not consider the use of public sanctions and enforcement resources.  The level of 
public enforcement will generally affect the level of private expenditures.  For example, public 
enforcement and sanctions may serve to “crowd out” private expenditures.  For an analysis of 
punishment for attempts, see Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J 
Legal Stud 435 (1990), David D. Friedman, Impossibility, Subjective Probability, and Punishment 
for Attempts, 20 J Legal Stud 179 (1991). 
5 Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private versus Socially Optimal 
Behavior, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 123 (1991). 
6 Id.  See also Charles T. Clotfelter, Private Security and the Public Safety, 5 J Urban Econ 388 
(1978). 
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who have not.  The inability to internalize these spillover effects will result in the 
underproduction of the security expenditures that serve to generally deter crime, 
and can result in a relative overproduction of resources that serve mainly to divert 
criminals less protected targets.7
This paper extends the current literature on the private security 
investments by explicitly examining the issue of the investment and production of 
intangible security goods.  The intangible nature of security inputs distinguishes 
the cybersecurity setting from the standard setting examined that involves private 
goods such as door locks.  Specifically, security expenditures in the cybersecurity 
setting often involve investments in information, including information on the 
nature and frequency of cyber attacks, information on future attacks, and 
information on existing vulnerabilities and potential defenses.  These 
cybersecurity expenditures have the characteristics of classic informational public 
goods.  The existence of public security goods requires an analysis that examines 
the rate at which such assets are produced in addition to the question of how such 
assets are deployed.   
It is shown that security investments in public goods can increase the 
divergence between the private and social incentives to produce and deploy 
security assets relative to the private security goods case.  Specifically, 
independent individual security expenditures on non appropriable public goods 
                                                 




can lead to free riding and underproduction.  The potential for free riding suggests 
that a legal or market response is required to insure the adequate production of 
public good security expenditures.  This paper examines how alternative private 
institutions, such as intellectual property protection, secrecy, or the use of 
contractual security collectives might address the pubic good problem.8   
The article is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the existing 
literature on the private production of security by examining the deployment of an 
existing set of security measures.  Section III alters the model to consider the 
production of intangible security assets.  Section IV considers production and 
deployment with secrecy or intellectual property protection.  Section V concludes. 
II.  THE PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PRIVATE SECURITY GOODS 
Prior studies of the private production of security have examined the consequence 
of two non-internalized spillover effects that result from such expenditures.  The 
first spillover effect is the positive effect that these expenditures have on reducing 
crime and other socially costly acts.  For example, consider investments in 
security that serve to decrease the net benefits of crime or other types of wealth 
transferring activity.  If such investments are not observable ex-ante, such 
expenditures not only decrease the expected losses to the person that makes the 
investment, but it also has a general deterrent effect that reduces the overall level 
                                                 
8 For a description of some of the institutions that have arisen to counter the cybercommons 
problem, see Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons: Overcoming Fundamental 
Vulnerabilities to Critical Infrastructure in a Networked World, 58 Bus L 349 (2002).  
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of criminal activity.  If the general deterrent effect is not internalized by those 
making these investments, such investments are will be underproduced.9
In contrast, if the existence (and lack) of such investments are observable 
to the criminal ex-ante, then criminals will be deterred from attacking a specific 
target.  However, they may instead substitute a more protected target for a less 
protected one.  Indeed, this substitution effect is more likely when alternative 
targets are close substitutes and of high value relative to the cost of committing 
the criminal act.10  In such cases expenditures merely divert crime to other targets 
rather than generally deterring crime.  In equilibrium, it is possible that there is an 
inefficient substitution away from generally deterring investments toward such 
crime diverting investments. 
To examine the economic incentives to invest in private security, consider 
a model of observable private security expenditures in a world without public 
enforcement.11  In this model, there are h web sites and t hackers.  Hackers engage 
in the unauthorized entry of sites, and such unauthorized entry of a site results in a 
gain to the hacker.  The unauthorized entry also causes a loss to the site, which 
                                                 
9 See Shavell, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ (cited in note 5). 
10 See Hui-Wen and P’ng, 14 Intl Rev L & Econ (cited in note 7).  
11 The basic model is from Shavell.  See Shavell, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 123 (cited in note 5).  
Given the nature of cybercrime, where the release of costly viruses and worms is not accompanies 
by monetary or significant utility gains by the hacker, the model in this section is modified to 
allow for costly criminal activity where the loss from an attack l is greater than the gain g to the 
criminal.  Shavell’s model assumed that the activity inducing the security expenditures took the 
form of costless transfers.  
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can be different than the gain to the hacker.12  In the absence of observable 
differences, hackers randomly choose between the h sites. Each of the t hackers 
choose a level of effort e in order to maximize the net gain from unauthorized 
entry:13
 
G(e,x) = eg(x) – c(e),        (1) 
 
where c(e) is the cost of effort, and g(x) is the gain to the hacker.14  The 
amount of the gain from unauthorized entry into a site will be a decreasing 
function of the level of site’s security expenditures x.15   The hacker’s first order 
condition is given by 
 
g(x) = c’(e),         (2) 
 
                                                 
12 The two are equal only when the unauthorized entry results in a costless transfer from the site to 
the hacker. 
13 Heuristically, e is the number of attacks initiated by a hacker.  
14 It is assumed that g’(x) < 0, g”(x) > 0.  c’(e) > 0, and c”(e) > 0.  Note that in many cases, a 
hacker can simultaneously launch cyber-attacks at many sites (e.g., through a cleverly designed 
worm or virus, suggesting decreasing returns.  However, diminishing returns will apply to the up 
front effort and resources needed to initiate the attack, with increases in e resulting in a more 
widespread attack. 
15 In this model, expenditures on security have a protective effect, that is, they reduce the amount 
of gain to the hacker when an attack is launched, and also reduces the amount of loss suffered by 
the site (and its users) when an attack takes place.   
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so that e = e(x).16
 
Implicitly differentiating the first order condition yields: 
 
e’(x) = g’(x)/c”(e) < 0.17        (3) 
 
This means that security expenditures decrease efforts by hackers to enter 
sites.  If all potential victims choose equal levels of security expenditures, the 
frequency of unauthorized entry φ(x) faced by each of h sites equals 
 
φ (x) = (t/h)e(x).       (4) 
 
Intuitively, if all sites have the same equilibrium security, then hackers 
will attack sites randomly. Thus, the total number of attacks, t*e(x), will be 
uniformly distributed among the h sites. 
                                                 
16 As noted in note 15, supra, the direct effect of security expenditures is to decrease the gain from 
any given attack, which in turn decreases the incentive of the hacker to expend costly effort at 
mounting attacks.  This model does not consider expenditures that directly affect the effort of 
hackers independent of altering the expected gain from an attack.  Modification of the model 
would then require that firms consider two types of expenditures, those that reduce the loss when 
attacks occur, and those that alter hackers’ incentives directly.  If we denote the latter type of 
expenditures by z, then the hacker’s effort function can be expressed as e = e(x,z).  Such 
expenditures would be more akin to law enforcement expenditures that are generally publicly 
provided, such as efforts to detect and subsequently sanction those that commit attacks, and are 
not considered in this paper.  
17 Following Shavell, it is assumed that e”(x) > 0.  See Shavell, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 123 (cited 
in note 5).   
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 If all h sites simultaneously increase x, the marginal effect on the 
frequency that a given site will suffer an attack is given by 
 
φ’(x) = (t/h)e’(x).18       (5) 
 
Potential victims are assumed to choose observable security expenditures 
x to minimize the cost of these expenditures plus the expected loss from crime: 
 
Lo(x) = φ (x|x’)l(x) + x,      (6) 
 
where x’ is the level of expenditures of others, φ (x|x’) is the frequency 
that a site will suffer a loss given expenditures x and x’,19 and l(x) is the 
magnitude of the loss to the victim.20  The first order condition is given by 
                                                 
18 This formulation assumes that hackers independently choose which site to attack, and that sites 
can be profitably attacked numerous times.  
19 If we assume that hackers observe the level of xi with error εi, and these observation errors are 
independent, then the probability that a given hacker will choose to attack site i equals the 
probability that εi < x’ – x + ε(1), where ε(1) is the lowest order statistic given h-1 draws.  If the 
error terms εi  have a probability density function given by f(εi), and cumulative density function 
given by F(εi) then the probability that a site will be the subject of any given attack equals.  The 
frequency of attacks will equal φ(x|x’) = te(x)F(x’ – x + ε(1)). 
20 We assume that l’(x) < 0, and l”(x) >0. This assumption is consistent with expenditures on 
security reducing the losses suffered by attacked sites, but with diminishing returns. In a more 
complex model, this may not be the case.  For example, higher levels of security may be 
simultaneously associated with higher costs for legitimate transactions. For example, the use of 
trusted systems may deter some consumers from visiting sites that use such systems.  The 
resulting foregone transactions can at some point outweigh the decreased loss from unauthorized 
transactions, causing l’(x) to be positive.  For purposes of this paper, we assume that the relevant 
range includes levels of security expenditures in which l’(x) < 0. 
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 -φ1(x|x’)l(x) – φ (x|x’)l’(x) = 1.     (7) 
 
Assuming that φ (x|x) = φ (x), the first order condition under conditions of 
symmetry (x’ = x) becomes: 
 
-φ1(x|x)l(x) – φ (x)l’(x) = 1.      (8) 
 
Let xo denote the solution to (8). 
 
As an alternative to uncoordinated security expenditures, sites could 
cooperatively choose security levels to eliminate the diversionary spillover 
effects.  If h sites collectively agree on a uniform level of expenditures, they 
would choose a level of expenditures to minimize 
 
h φ (x)l(x) + hx.        (9) 
 
The first order condition is given by 
 




Let x* denote the solution to the cooperative first order condition (10). 
 
Finally, we can consider the social optimum, which considers the cost of 
resources used by the hackers and the losses caused by their behavior.  The social 
objective function is to minimize the costs of precaution by the sites and effort by 
the hackers plus the amount of social loss from the unauthorized activity: 
 
hx + t(c(e(x)) + e(x)s(x)).      (11) 
 
Where s(x) = l(x) – g(x) is the social cost of the hacker’s activity.   
 
The first order condition equals: 
 
-(t/h)(c’(e)e’(x) + s’(x)e(x) + s(x)e’(x)) = 1.    (12) 
 
The social first order condition can be rewritten as 
 
-φ’(x)(c’(e) + s(x)) – φ (x)s’(x) = 1     (13) 
 
Given that the hacker sets the marginal cost of effort equal to the gain 
from the crime, g(x) = c’(e), and the first order condition is given by: 
11 
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  -φ’(x)l(x) – φ (x)s’(x) = 1      (14) 
 
Table 1 lists the three first order conditions for the individual, cooperative, 
and social objective functions in the private goods case.   
 
Table 1 – First Order Conditions: Private Goods Case 
 
 First Order Condition Level of Security 
Social  -φ’(x)l(x) –  φ (x)s’(x) = 1. x** 
Individual -φ1(x|x’)l(x) – φ (x|x’)l’(x) = 1. xo
Cooperatives - φ’(x)l(x) – φ (x)l’(x) = 1. x* 
 
Assuming that –s’(x) = -l’(x) + g’(x) < -l’(x), it is clear that x* > x**.  
That is, the cooperatives have an incentive to overinvest in security expenditures.  
Intuitively, a cooperative’s marginal incentive to invest in security is based upon 
the marginal reduction in the loss including the amount of the transfer, while 
social incentives are based upon the smaller loss net of the transfer amount. These 
additional expenditures on security are induced by a desire to reduce the amount 
12 
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of the transfer, which is not a social loss.21 This overinvestment effect is most 
pronounced in the case of pure transfers that are large in magnitude.22  On the 
other hand, this effect is small for crimes that cause large losses relative to the 
gains to the criminal.23
The relationship between the individual, uncoordinated level of security 
and the collective amount is ambiguous, and depends upon both the magnitude of 
the private and social losses and upon the relative magnitude of the marginal 
deterrence effect - φ’(x)l(x) and the diversion effect -φ1(x|x)l(x).  If -φ1(x*|x*)l(x*) 
> (<) - φ’(x*)l(x*), then xo > (<) x*.  Because of this ambiguity, it is also the case 
that the individual level can be greater than or less than the socially optimal level. 
To illustrate these relationships, Figure 1 shows a simulated equilibrium 
under the individual, cooperative, and social first order conditions.  For purposes 
of the simulation, we assume that c(e) = αe2, and g(x) = G/(k(1+x)), and l(x) = 
G/(λ(1+x)), where k ≥ λ.  This latter assumption is made so that the gain from 
unauthorized entry is less than the loss imposed on the site.  When k = λ, the 
unauthorized entry results in a costless transfer where the gain to the hacker 
equals the loss to the site.  With the specific forms assumed above, e(x) = 
G/(2αk(1+x)), and p(x) = tG/(2hαk(1+x)).   
                                                 
21 See Shavell, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 123 (cited in note 5).  
22 Id. 
23 One example would be acts of vandalism that cause large losses to property, but are of little 
value to the vandal.   
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 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 shows a the first order conditions listed in Table 1 and the 
equilibrium levels of security for  k = λ = 20, G = 100, h = 16, t = 10, and α = .1.  
The assumption that k = λ = 20 means that the gain to the hacker equals the loss 
to the site, so that the direct social loss from unauthorized entry is zero.  Under 
these assumptions, the social level of security x** equals 3.2 units per site.  The 
cooperatively set level of security xo equals 4.3 units per site, and shows the 
overincentive such cooperatives have to invest in security to prevent privately 
costly but socially neutral transfers.   
The example also illustrates the incentive to invest in security in order to 
divert hackers towards other sites. The individual, uncoordinated level of security 
x* equals 9.9 units per site, which is over three times the level of social level of 
security x**.24   
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
24 Normal scores have been extensively computed.  See Herbert A. David and H. N. Nagaraja, 
Order Statistics (Wiley-Interscience 3d ed, 2003). 
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Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium where the unauthorized entry results in 
a direct social loss.  Specifically, the simulation depicted in Figure 2 shows the 
equilibrium when k =  20, λ = 10, G = 100, h = 16, t = 10, and α = .1.  Under 
these assumptions, the ratio l(x)/g(x) = k/λ = 2.  In order to model the individual 
first order conditions, we assumed that the εi, and identically and independently 
normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation equal to one.  Under 
these assumptions, the probability that site i will be the subject of any given attack 
equals the probability that εi < x’ – x + ε(1), where ε(1) is the expected lowest order 
statistic given h-1 draws (also known as the normal score when the εi, have a 
standard normal distribution).25 Under these assumptions, the social level of 
security x** equals 5.1 units, the cooperatively set level, xo equals 5.7 units, and 
the individual level x* equals 14.3 units.  The introduction of socially costly cyber 
attacks moves the cooperative and social level of security closer together, but 
increases the divergence between the individual, uncoordinated level of security 
and the social level of security. 
Uncoordinated production of security does not necessarily produce the 
large overincentive illustrated in Figure 2.  To illustrate this, Figure 3 shows the 
equilibrium when standard deviation of the εi is increased to 20.  A larger 
standard deviation reduces the individual incentive to produce security so that the 
individual level x* falls to 5.5 units, below the cooperative level, but still above, 
                                                 
25 In the example, this is true both in absolute and percentage terms. 
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in this example, the individual level.  Intuitively, a larger standard deviation for 
the εi, reduces the marginal effect of expenditures on x by making it more likely 
that marginal expenditures will be overcome by the random noise.26
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
  
III.  PUBLIC SECURITY GOODS 
Prior models have examined the provision of private security goods such as door 
locks or security guards.  In the cybersecurity context, expenditures on security 
are likely to be investments in information about the nature and frequency of past 
attacks, information about pending attacks, and information about the existence of 
vulnerabilities to and potential defenses against cyberattacks.  Such information is 
a classic public good that once produced, can be consumed by multiple sites in a 
nonrivalrous fashion.27
In this section, the model presented in Section I is modified to examine the 
private and social incentives to produce intangible security goods that have the 
characteristics of public goods.   In order to model the production and use of 
public good security expenditures, we assume that a unit of x produced by one site 
                                                 
26 For a similar analysis of the effect of uncertainty in the litigation context, see Richard Craswell 
and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J L, Econ, & Org 279 (1986). 
27 See Amitai Aviram and Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55 
Ala L Rev 231 (2004) (noting non-rivalrous nature of information, and analyzing strategic barrier 
to information sharing). 
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can be used in a nonrivalrous fashion by the other h – 1 sites.28  Under these 
assumptions, the social objective function would be to minimize the costs of 
precaution, effort at crime, and the social loss of crime: 
 
x + t(c(e(x)) + e(x)s(x)).      (15) 
 
The first order condition is given by: 
 
-t(c’(e)e’(x) + s’(x)e(x) + s(x)e’(x)) = 1.    (16) 
 
The social first order condition can be rewritten as 
 
                                                 
28 Note this does not imply that security expenditures are conducted in a centralized fashion.  
Indeed, the collection of information often requires examining global information from many 
individual sites in order to analyze and detect patterns of attacks.  Thus, the benefit of a given total 
level of security expenditures will exhibit network effect – that is, a given level of security 
expenditures distributed over h sites will have a greater effect in reducing losses to the site and 
gains to the criminal than the same level of expenditure by a single site.  In terms of the model,  l 
= l(x,s), where l2(x,s) < 0.  Similarly, information collected from numerous diverse sources may 
be more valuable than the same number of repeated observations by a few firms. See generally, 
Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge In Society, 35 Am Econ Rev 519 (1945).  This analysis 
suggests that firms have a great incentive to share information in such a setting.  Similar incentives 
for sharing of information between competitive firms have raised antitrust concerns.  For example, 
McCarran Ferguson Act (U.S. Code Title 15, Chapter 20) makes the cooperative gathering of data 
for the purpose of ratemaking exempt from the federal antitrust statutes when undertaken by state 
regulated insurance companies.  For an analysis of information sharing and antitrust in the 
cybersecurity context, see Aviram and Tor, 55 Ala L Rev 231 (cited in note 27).  For economic 
analyses of information sharing between competing firms, see Olivier Armantier and Oliver 
Richard, Exchanges of Cost Information in the Airline Industry, 34 Rand J Econ 461 (2003); Barry 
S. Eisenberg, Information Exchange Among Competitors: The Issue of Relative Value Scales for 
Physicians’ Services, 23 J L & Econ 461 (1981); Esther Gal-Or, Information Transmission-
Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria, 53 Rev Econ Stud 85 (1986).   
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 -h(φ’(x)l(x) + φ (x)s’(x)) = 1      (17) 
 
Ceteris paribus, the level of security applied to each individual is higher 
than in the private goods case because each unit of x is now simultaneously 
applied to h potential victims.   Total spending can be less than in the private 
goods case, as any unit of x is not separately incurred by each of the h potential 
victims. 
If the h sites cooperatively choose a level of expenditures, they would 
attempt to minimize: 
 
h φ (x)l(x) + x.        (18) 
 
The first order condition is given by 
 
-h(φ’(x)l(x) + φ (x)l’(x)) = 1.      (19) 
 
Comparing (19) to the social first order condition (17), we see that the 
public goods case preserves the relative relationship between the cooperative and 
socially optimal level of security expenditures.  That is, cooperative spending 
results in the overproduction of public as well as private security goods due to an 
18 
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excessive incentive to reduce the size of transfers that do not represent a social 
loss. 
Finally, consider the case where individuals choose to invest in public 
security goods.  Consider first the case where such investments cannot be 
appropriated by those who make them, so that any private investments can be 
used by all participants in the market.  The objective function on each individual 
is to minimize: 
 
 φ (xT)l(xT) + x,       (20) 
 
where xT equals the total expenditures on x by all h potential victims. 
 
The first order condition equals 
 
-φ’(xT)l(xT) – φ (xT)l’(xT) = 1.      (21) 
 
Table 2 summarizes the first order conditions for the public goods case. 
 
Table 2 – First Order Conditions – Public Goods Case 
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 First Order Condition 
Social  -h[φ’(x)l(x) +  φ (x)s’(x)] = 1. 
Individual -φ’(xT)l(xT) - φ(xT)l’(xT) = 1. 
Cooperatives -h[φ’(x)l(x) + φ (x)l’(x)] = 1. 
 
Note that by definition φ’(xT) = φ’(x), and that the first order condition 
(21) is satisfied at xT = x*, the cooperative level of expenditure in the private 
goods case.  The total level of expenditures implied by the first order condition 
(21) is less than the cooperative level implied by (19).  Note that this result differs 
from the private goods case.  As shown in the simulations contained in Section II, 
it is possible for the individual uncoordinated level of private security 
expenditures to exceed those that would be set cooperatively.  Intuitively, the 
potential to divert criminals towards another site can provide a powerful marginal 
incentive to spend on security.  However, in the public goods case considered 
here, private expenditures simultaneously protect others’ sites.  Thus, such 
expenditures do not serve to divert hacker from the investor’s site toward these 
other sites. 
Moreover, the first order conditions do not yield a unique allocation of the 
security expenditures among the h sites.  Thus, while individual expenditures 
equal to x*/h by all h sites is an equilibrium, there are also multiple equilibria in 
which h-k sites spend zero, and k  spend x*/k.  Any individual site would prefer 
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and equilibrium where they were one of the h-k spending zero.  Indeed, this result 
is the familiar free-riding problem in the presence of non-appropriable public 
goods.  The existence of multiple equilibria and the potential for free-riding 
suggests that some mechanism to mitigate the free riding problem and/or solve the 
coordination problem is required.   
To gain a sense of the relative magnitude of the problems, Figure 3 shows 
the results of a market simulation of relative levels of private security under the 
individual, cooperative, and social first order conditions for a public good.  For 
the purposes of this simulation, assume the same functional forms as the private 
good simulations above.   
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
Figure 4 shows the individual, cooperative and social first order conditions 
when the entry results in a pure transfer.  Specifically, the simulations depicted in 
Figure 1 assume that  k = λ = 20, G = 100, h = 50, t = 30, and α = .1.  Under 
these assumptions, the first order conditions yield a cooperative level of 
precaution equals 18.5 units, and an individual level of precaution equals 4.3 
units.  This is compared to the social level of precaution, which equals 14.5 units.  
Thus, for this particular simulation, the cooperatively set level of precaution 
results in a 27.6 percent increase over the level given by the social first order 
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condition.  Not that, in contrast to the private goods case in which the individual, 
uncoordinated level of security exceeded the social level, the individual first order 
condition in the public goods case yields a total level of precaution that is 29 
percent of the level given by the social first order condition. 
 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
Figure 5 shows the first order conditions when k is increased to 50.  Under 
these assumptions, the ratio g(x)/l(x) = 20/50 = .4, so that the gain from an 
authorized entry is 40% of the loss caused the unauthorized entry.  Under these 
assumptions, the individual, social, and cooperative level of security equals 2.9 
units, 12.3 units, and 13.4 units respectively.  Note that the cooperative level of 
precaution is only 8.9 percent greater than the social level, while the individual 
level is only 23 percent of the social level.  Thus, under these conditions, an 
increase in the relative social cost of unauthorized entry will decrease the 
overproduction associated with the cooperative level of security, and increase the 
underproduction associated with uncoordinated security expenditures. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the relative efficiency of coordinated 
and individual uncoordinated public good security expenditures will depend upon 
the gain to harm ratio.  The issue of social versus private losses in the 
cybersecurity context is a complex one.  Take for example a directed denial of 
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service attack that prevents consumers from accessing a particular e-commerce 
site, which at first blush, seems analogous to vandalism, an act with a low gain to 
loss ratio.  However, if customers make purchases at a competitor’s site, then the 
lost sales of the attacked site would be private but not social losses, thus resulting 
is a gain to loss ratio that is close to one.  The release of destructive worms and 
viruses may be more akin to vandalism.  In many cases, the release of the 
destructive or disruptive worm or virus is not apparently associated with an 
attempt to directly or indirectly transfer resources, with the apparent benefit to the 
person releasing it being the utility he obtains from the act.29   As noted above, in 
such a case, any distortion between the cooperative and social level of private 
security expenditures will be small. 
 
IV.  THE PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SECURITY GOODS 
The results from the private good case suggest that uncoordinated markets may 
under or over produce private security relative to the social optimum.  Further, in 
                                                 
29 On the other hand, worms and viruses may be ways in which hackers are collecting information 
about how to lower the cost of transferring wealth in the future.  In this sense, the release of a 
worm of virus may be a form of planning expenditures.  These expenditures can induce marginal 
social costs by accelerating the level of defensive as well as offensive security expenditures, which 
are social costs.  Thus, claims by hacker that they are providing a social service by exposing 
potential security flaws may not be true, especially if the flaw is publicly disclosed.  Any benefits 
from the information gained from the worm may be outweighed by the direct costs caused by the 
virus, and by the increased present value of resources induced to protect sites from such worms.  
Even if the information gained is not publicly disclosed, the accelerated rate of defensive 
expenditures that are induced by such attacks may increase social costs.  For a discussion of the 
positive informational externalities that result from the commission of crimes, see Kermit Daniel 
and John R. Lott, Jr., Should Criminal Penalties Include Third-Party Avoidance Costs?, 14 J 
Legal Stud 523 (1995).   
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this model, collective action to provide private good security expenditures will 
result in the overproduction of private security expenditures.  Thus, while 
uncoordinated markets will not in general produce the first-best allocation of 
private security expenditures, neither will cooperative security investments.  
The analysis in Section II shows that the public good nature of 
cybersecurity investments presents additional issues that are not present in the 
private goods case.  The nonrivalrous nature of public good security expenditures 
suggests that such goods, once produced, should be made available for use by all 
sites.  On the other hand, absent some way to appropriate the gains from public 
security investments, individual firms or groups may not have sufficient 
individual incentives to make such investments. 
One implication is that the presence of public goods in the cybersecurity 
context would result in a great incentive to form cooperative security 
arrangements in such situations.30  However, absent the existence of enforceable 
intellectual property rights or some other mechanism to appropriate the returns 
from private security expenditures, potential victims would have an incentive to 
                                                 
30 Indeed, the use of prior contracts is suggested by Friedman as a solution to externalities present 
in the private law enforcement context.  See Friedman, 8 J Legal Stud 299 (cited in note 1).  For 
an analysis of the use of prior contracting as a way to produce public goods, including innovation, 
see Ben T. Yu. Prior Contracting and Innovation, 24 J L & Econ 215 (1981).  See also Frye, 58 
Bus L at 361 (cited in note 8) (describing private sector groups that have formed to share 
information and address cybersecurity issues, including Information Sharing and Assessment 
Centers (ISACs) in the financial services, energy, transportation, vital human services, and 
communication information services sectors, as well as the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure 
Security (PCIS), which coordinates the activities of the industry based ISACs). 
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free ride by refusing to join the cooperative security venture, then free riding on 
the public good output of the coalition.   
To illustrate this point, consider the example used in the simulation 
contained underlying Figure 4, with k = 50, λ = 20, G = 100, h = 50, t = 30, and 
α = .1.  Under these assumptions, the cooperative level of security equals 13.4 
units with h sites participating.  If each of the h sites agrees ex-ante to pay an 
equal share of the total costs of security, the expected loss plus pro-rata share 
equals .413 for each site. 
Now suppose one site refuses to join.  The remaining h-1 sites will seek to 
minimize: 
 
(h-1) φ (x)l(x) + x.       (22) 
 
The cooperative level of security chosen by h-1 sites equals 13.3 units.  If 
the site that refused to join the cooperative is able to free ride on the expenditures 
of the h-1 sites in the cooperative, it will face a lower expected loss equal to .147.  
Thus, the slight increase in expected loss resulting from the lower security 
expenditures is more than offset by the savings of their pro rata share of 
cooperative security costs.  Further, it can be demonstrated that a there is a similar 
incentive to defect from the h-1, h-2 … 2 size cooperative under these 
circumstances. 
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Concerns over inadequate private investment in cybersecurity have led the 
federal government to suggest that some type of government regulation may be 
required.31  It has been suggested, for example, that the government mandate 
minimum security standards, or require that private firms disclose the nature and 
frequency of cyber attacks aimed at their sites and networks.32  However, such 
government mandates can generate their own inefficiencies.  For example, the 
government choice of standard may result in a choice that is inferior to whatever 
potentially imperfect choice would have been made by the market. 33  Further, 
government choice of a standard may stifle experimentation and innovation the 
can lead to dynamic inefficiency.34  Mandatory disclosure can be overinclusive, 
requiring the disclosure of information with a marginal value less than the 
marginal cost of collection and disclosure.35  Further, mandatory disclosure can 
                                                 
31 See Jonathan Krim, Help Fix Cybersecurity or Else, U.S. Tells Industry, Washington Post E02 
(Dec 4, 2003) (Bush administration official warning regulation looms if private companies do not 
increase private efforts at providing cyber-security). The Bush administration has taken a 
relatively hands off approach to this issue.  See, e.g., The National Strategy to Protect Cyberspace 
(February 2003). 
32 See Frye, 58 Bus L 349 (cited in note 8). 
33 See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Winners, Losers and Microsoft: 
Competition and Antitrust in High Technology (Independent Institute, 1999). 
34 See Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51 
Emory L J 1 (2002). 
35 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 




induce firms to engage in less information collection, and greater free riding 
problems.36
One an alternative to government standards or mandated disclosure would 
be for the government to encourage firms to produce information through use of 
property rights to information.37  What is critical is that sites that undertake 
cooperative investments in public good security expenditures find some way to 
exclude non-payers.38  A mechanism to exclude non-payers will prevent a firm 
refusing to join the collective from free riding on the expenditures of the 
collective.  Further, given that the level of protection applied to a firm that does 
not join the collective will be below that applied to members of the collective, non 
members will suffer more frequent attacks.  If this is not done, then sites will 
refuse to join the cooperative and attempt to free ride off the information provided 
by the cooperative.   
As is the case with any idea or informational public good, the private 
production of public goods can be induced through intellectual property 
                                                 
36 See D. Bruce Johnsen, The Limits of Mandatory Disclosure: Regulatory Taking under the 
Investment Company Act, mimeo, George Mason University (2003) (discussing SEC disclosure 
rules and their suppression of information production). 
37 See generally, Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J L & Econ 293 
(1970). 
38 The clear definition of intellectual property rights, as well as members’ responsibility for 
preventing the further dissemination of sensitive information, should be central issue when an 
information sharing group or security cooperative is formed.  No systematic analysis of the 
contractual agreements regarding intellectual property rights and the maintenance of secrecy 
currently has been done.  A closely related survey of the treatment of intellectual property rights 
for private standard setting organizations found wide variation in the treatment of intellectual 
property rights.  See Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting 
Organizations, 90 Cal L Rev 1889 (2002).  
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protection.  For example, security research firms use proprietary technology to 
collect and analyze data about cyber attacks.39  While security expenditures that 
involve the collection and analysis of information may not be protected under the 
federal copyright laws, or rise to the level of novelty or nonobviousness required 
for protection under the federal patent laws,40 the computer programs used to 
track and analyze such data may be.  Further, patent protection may be available 
for novel and nonobvious computer programs and business methods. 
Even if use of statutory intellectual property right protection, such as 
copyright or patents, is not be feasible, security collectives can use secrecy, 
supported by contractual restrictions on the members, to prevent widespread free 
riding.41  In this context, secrecy means that the existence and content of a 
specific security level x is not disclosed ex-ante to other sites or to potential 
hackers.  This form of secrecy has two offsetting effects.  First, it allows 
individuals to appropriate the gains from their private expenditures by precluding 
other sites from appropriating information it possesses.42  To the extent secrecy 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Leslie Walker, The View from Symatec’s Security Central, Washington Post E01(Jan 
9, 2003) (describing the use of proprietary software and systems to monitor and analyze the nature 
and frequency of cyber attacks.  The information and analysis is subsequently sold to subscriber 
networks).   
40 Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fiest Publications v Rural Telephone Service, 499 
US 340 (1991), protection for factual compilations under the federal copyright laws is limited. 
Congress has recently considered federal database protection.  See, e.g., Database and Collections 
of Information Misappropriation Act, HR 3261, October 8, 2003. 
41 See, generally Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, Privacy and Firms, 79 Den L Rev 
526 (2002). 
42 Note that such protection is not perfect.  See, e.g., William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, 
The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law at 354-371 (Belknap, 2003) (discussing the 
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prevents free-riding, its use can encourage private expenditures on public good 
security expenditures.  On the other hand, use of secrecy may not allow for the 
diverting effect generated by expenditures that are publicly disclosed.  Thus, its 
use may suppress the incentive for individuals to expend private resources on 
public good security expenditures. 
To examine the effect of secrecy consider the objective function for each 
cooperative of size s.  Such a cooperative will attempt to minimize: 
 
 s* φ (x|x’)l(x|x’) + x,       (21) 
 
If secrecy is not perfect, both the probability and the amount of the loss 
are conditional on x’, the amount spent by the other h - s potential victims. The 
conditional probability and loss amounts capture two distinct effects.  The first is 
the diversion effect that results from criminals substituting into less protected 
targets.  The second effect is the spillover from expenditures by others x’ that can 
be appropriated by the cooperative s. The first order condition equals 
 
-s(φ1(x|x’)l(x|x’) + φ (x|x’)l’(x|x’)) = 1.    (22) 
                                                                                                                                     
economics of trade secret law).  However, in the context of some cybersecurity settings, a timing 
advantage can be used to appropriate the returns from expenditures on information.  For example, 
timely notice of IP addresses being used to launch distributed denial of service attacks or other 
types of cyber attacks allow the targets to block incoming mail from these addresses before large 
scale damage is incurred.  Small delays in the transmission of this information can delay such 
preventative measures, and will increase the amount of loss from such attacks. 
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 To simplify matters, suppose that secrecy turns the security goods into the 
equivalent of an unobserved private good so that security measures are not 
observable ex-ante, either by criminal or by other potential victims.  In this case, 
φ1(x|x’) = 0, as both the diversion effect and the spillover effect of expenditures 
by others on the probability of loss will be zero.  Further, under these 
circumstances, there will be no spillover effect of expenditures by others on the 
amount of loss, i.e., l’(x|x’) = l’(x). If the cooperative of size s takes the frequency 
of an attack φ as exogenous, the first order condition becomes 
 
-sφ l’(x) = 1       (23) 
 
If s = 1, then each individual spends less than the cooperative level. Using 
the numbers and the example used to generate Figure 2, and if we assume that φ = 
φ (x),43 then each of the h sites will set their level of security at 2.1 units.  The 
total amount of security produced is 2.1*50 = 105 units.  However, only 2.1 units 
of security would be applied to any given site.  In contrast, the uncoordinated 
                                                 
43 Hially-Ü}ô the criminals expectation of the equilibrium level of expenditures on security x may 
differ from that implied by the first order condition (23).  If criminals have operated in an 
environment of low security in the past, and are not informed ex-ante of the increase in x, the 
criminal’s estimate of x would be lower than the actual level of x, and his estimate of φ will be 
higher than φ (x).  Given this, the levels of spending given by (23) will underestimate the actual 
level.  Over time, criminals will adjust their estimate of x over time so that φ = φ(x), and sites will 
adjust x until equilibrium is reached. 
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individual equilibrium level of security would result in the production of 2.9 units 
of security that would be simultaneously applied to all h sites.  Thus, the result of 
individual investments with secrecy would be a low protection, high cost 
equilibrium.   
This result suggests the inefficiency of investment by individual firms in 
public good security expenditures that are kept secret.  However, such an 
inefficiency would be eliminated if individual firms formed collectives.  The 
individual members would have to agree ex-ante to pay a pro-rata share of the 
costs of the security collective.  Furthermore, they would also have to agree to 
protect the information generated and shared by members of the collective from 
disclosure to non-members. 44  As noted above, failure to do so would give 
individual sites an incentive to free ride by remaining outside the cooperative. 
To see this point, suppose that s = h.  A collective with h members would 
produce 10.4 units of security.  This level is below both the collective level given 
in equation (21) and the social level given in equation (17).  Thus, if secrecy is 
necessary for the stability of cooperative spending, there could be some 
underproduction of security.   However, this is not necessarily the case.  Because, 
the cooperative level of security is greater than the social optimum, the reduced 
incentive to spend on secrecy can move security expenditures toward the socially 
                                                 
44 The security collectives would likely also include requirements that members maintain 
minimum security standards, and may require that members collect and report information in a 
timely manner. 
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optimal level.  Consider, for example, the case where the unauthorized entry 
results in a pure transfer, so that k = 20.   In this case, secrecy results in a security 
expenditure of 14.5 units, which coincides with the social level.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis has examined the incentive to produce private security 
expenditures.  While prior analyses have examined the provision of security 
goods that have the characteristics of private goods, the analysis in this paper 
examined expenditures on security, such as information, that have the 
characteristics of public goods.   
In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated 
security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods 
case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to 
free ride.  Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to 
facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of 
information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of 
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